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The Coronavirus Pandemic 1 Year On—What Went Wrong?
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD
January 30, 2021, marked the firstanniversary of the declaration bythe World Health Organization
(WHO) of COVID-19 as a public health
emergency of international concern
(PHEIC). Thus far, the world has been no
match for SARS-CoV-2, with more than 100
million cases and 2.5 million deaths. The
US has been among the world’s poorest
performers in addressing the pandemic,
with more than 500 000 deaths.
Vaccines offer the best chance of
returning to normal, but circulating vari-
ants pose a major obstacle, particularly the
emergence of variants that are more trans-
missible and are developing partial resis-
tance to vaccines against SARS-CoV-2.
With rampant global circulation, SARS-
CoV-2 will have ample opportunity to
mutate further.
What went wrong and how can society
learn from its greatest failures?
The Collapse of Global Solidarity
At a national level, the lessons are clear,
including undervaluing science, weak
public health infrastructure, and public
resistance to risk mitigation measures like
wearing a mask. At the global level, the col-
lective failures have been still greater. By
the time the World Health Assembly met in
May 2020, the agency was caught in a geo-
political conflict between the US and China.
World Health Assembly resolution 73.1
directed the WHO’s Director-General to
appoint the Independent Panel for Pandemic
Preparedness and Response (IPPPR),
charged with comprehensively evaluating
the international health response, espe-
cially the WHO’s role. Of particular concern
was identifying the zoonotic origins of
SARS-CoV-2. The Assembly similarly estab-
lished the International Health Regulations
(IHR) Review Committee to examine the
utility of the world’s regulations for govern-
ing health security.
On January 18, the IPPPR released its
second interim report to the WHO’s execu-
tive board. Just days earlier, on January 13,
an expert WHO team finally arrived in
Wuhan, China, to study SARS-CoV-2’s bio-
logical origins. It took the agency more than
a year to negotiate the visit with China,
jeopardizing the chance to discover the ori-
gins of SARS-CoV-2. The WHO concluded
on February 9 that the initial outbreak in
Wuhan was most likely naturally occurring,
rather than an accidental leak from the
Wuhan Institute of Technology, but did give
credence to the idea that SARS-CoV-2 origi-
nated from an animal shipment from
abroad. Even now, there is little transpar-
ency as to the scope of the WHO’s access to
key geographic locations, complete data,
and open discussions with Chinese health
workers and scientists. The IPPPR’s interim
report lays bare the failures of the global
response, concluding that it would be
“unconscionable” to fail to heed the lessons
of the pandemic.
Early Failure of the Global Health
System
SARS-CoV-2 is a highly transmissible
p a t h o g e n , f u e l e d by a sy m p t o m a t i c
spread. Rapid detection of and response
at the Wuhan wet market may not have
prevented the pandemic, but it was the
world’s only opportunity. Yet a timeline of
events shows major delays in China’s
reporting and the veracity of information
provided to the WHO. The IPPPR con-
cluded the global alert system and the
WHO’s power to verify key facts are not
“fit for purpose.”
Although the earliest cases probably
date back to early December 2019, Wuhan
hospitals were seeing novel unexplained
pneumonias by mid-December. On Decem-
ber 31, 2019, China’s National Health Com-
mission finally announced an outbreak of
viral pneumonia unrelated to SARS that
was “under control” and exhibited no evi-
dence of human-to-human transmission.
Yet China did not report the novel viral
clusters to the WHO, even though the IHR
requires notification within 24 hours.
Instead, the WHO was alerted through
news and social media outlets. The IHR
requires the WHO to confirm nonofficial
information with the country of origin, but
China did not confirm until January 3,
2020. Due to the lack of accurate and full
reporting, the WHO continued to publish
inaccurate information regarding human-to-
human transmission.
A Better System for Outbreak
Detection and Verification
The timeline of events clearly shows the
need to empower the WHO to indepen-
dently verify official reports and to deploy
support and containment personnel to
member states, including to places where
the outbreak originated. Sovereign states
will almost certainly resist IPPPR proposals
to empower the WHO to enter their terri-
tory and gain access to full information.
Yet given the unimaginable suffering
and economic loss due to the pandemic,
strong accountability mechanisms are
warranted, including an inspectorate
system like the ones currently in nuclear
nonproliferation treaties.
Also, when the WHO receives credible
outbreak information (regardless of the
source), it must be able to act while protect-
ing its source from possible retaliation. The
IHR provides only limited confidentiality pro-
tection of the data source, which places
whistleblowers in potential peril.
An Amply Funded WHO
The world needs a better-resourced WHO.
The agency’s biannual budget typically
ranges between $4 billion and $5 billion
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(about that of a large US hospital), with
about three-quarters earmarked for spe-
cific donor initiatives. Member states should
at least double their assessed contributions
to the WHO and provide the organization
with flexibility to put funding toward the
most pressing health threats.
Declaring a PHEIC
The WHO has been criticized for not
declaring COVID-19 a global health emer-
gency until January 30, 2020, by which
time SARS-CoV-2 had spread to 20 places
outside China. Yet with limited informa-
tion, the agency had valid concerns about
stimulating panic and an overreaction,
which could dilute the significance of
future PHEIC declarations. Contrasted
with the rigid, binary nature of current
PHEIC determinations, an intermediate
level declaration could alert countries of
evolving threats.
Coordinated National Responses
Even after the PHEIC had been declared,
countries were slow to act. In part because
governments failed to build IHR core health
system capacities, including surveillance,
testing, and contact tracing. Stronger IHR
mechanisms to secure funding for and to
evaluate health systems would support
core capacities, leaving countries far more
prepared in the future. National leaders
also sought to preserve their economies,
though the health-vs-economy dichotomy
proved erroneous. Even as the global
economy declined by more than $7 trillion,
countries that responded aggressively
fared far better economically. Countries
must learn from experience, both by invest-
ing in pandemic preparedness and prioritiz-
ing health once an outbreak strikes.
Nowhere was the collapse of global
solidarity greater than in the global com-
petition for scarce medical resources.
Wealthier nations bought up the world’s
supplies for personal protective equip-
ment, ventilators, and test kits, creating a
global bidding war in which poorer coun-
tries could not compete. And although the
approval of COVID-19 vaccines before the
end of 2020 was a historic achievement, it
is clouded by inequitable distribution.
High-income countries with their own vac-
cine supply deals are expected to vacci-
nate nearly their entire populations by the
end of 2021. Lower-income countries (reliant
on the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access
Facility) may not accomplish the same until
2 years later, with some estimates projecting
the world will not be fully vaccinated for a
decade. In addition to being inequitable, it
also puts the whole world at greater risk as
SARS-CoV-2 will continue to circulate,
mutate to evade vaccines, and again spread
across the globe. The major disruptions in
low- and middle-income countries’ health
services, including childhood immunizations,
will continue to cause excess deaths well
beyond COVID-19.
Heeding the Warnings for Future
Pandemics
Even after the catastrophic effects of ear-
lier outbreaks of SARS, Ebola virus disease,
and Zika virus disease, nations became com-
placent, failing to prepare domestically or
fund global response capabilities. The world
largely ignored glaring biological warning
signals—but that must not be the case this
time. With a pandemic that has touched ev-
ery life on the globe, has already cost more
than 2 million lives, has devastated econo-
mies, and will continue to afflict the health
of societies for years to come, the calls to re-
imagine and re-create systems for global
health security must not go unheeded.
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